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Leon h e r :  
Now that term limits have been mentioned, we will get a little 
more detailed discussion of the Term Limits Case. To speak to us 
on that subject, we have Professor Bennett L. Gershman of Pace 
Law School, a scholar of very distinguished background and also 
one who has rendered public service, so I suppose he has a 
somewhat experienced view of term limits. He has mitten two 
books. He came to my attention when I saw what I thought was 
an excellent article in the New York Law Journal on the question 
of term limits and also on gun control. Of course, I thought it 
was one which I agreed with, but in any event, we now have the 
pleasure of his company and the education he will give us. 
Professor Gershman. 
Professor Bennett L. Gershman:" 
It is a pleasure to be here. The revival of the Tenth 
Amendment1 to counter various exercises of national power has 
been one of the preeminent themes of the Supreme Court's recent 
jurisprudence. Once regarded as a mere 'truismw that reflected a 
governmental b a l m  of power decidedly f a v o ~ g  the federal 
government, the Tenth Amendment, as interpreted by the Court's 
current majority, has produced a radical transformation toward 
broader state sovereignty over matters that previously s m e d  
reasonably well-settled as within Congress' prerogative.2 Indeed, 
the majority's somewhat tendentious "states' rights* rhetoric puts 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law 
1. U.S. Co~sr. amend X. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers 
not delegated to the United !Wes by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. 
2. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1W) (rejecting 
contention that the Tenth Amendment is merely a truism and stating that if a 
power is attributable to state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, 
then it is not a power conferred on Congress) (citing United States v. Dxby, 
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1341)). 
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this group of Justices in lockstep with the so-called Conservative 
Revolution and the Republican Party's Contract With America.3 
. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. ~hornton,4 a bare majority, 
formed only because one of the Court's strong Tenth Amendment 
proponents decided to switch camps,s rejected an iconoclastic 
interpretation of the Constitution that, if accepted, would have 
dramatically altered the way America governs itself by judicial 
construction. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the Court held that 
"[a]llowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for 
congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers' 
vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people 
of the United States. "6 
The idea of term limits for elected government officials is 
hardly new. States have imposed term limits on their own elected 
officials from the time of our Nation's f~und ing .~  This political 
3. See 141 CONG. REC. HI82 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995) (Statement of 
Rep. Fox). The Contract with America states in pertinent part: 
Mr. Speaker, our Contract With America states on the fxst day of 
Congress a Republican House will force Congress to live under the 
same laws as everyone else, cut one-third of committee staffs, and cut 
the congressional budget. We have done that. 
In the next 93 days we will vote on the following 10 items: 
. . .  
Ten. Congressional term limits to make Congress a citizen legislature. 
This is our Contract with America. 
Id. 
4. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995). 
5. Compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 1 15 S. Ct. 1842, 1873 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("mhe National Government is and must be 
controlled by the people without collateral interference by the States."). with 
U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The 
statute now before us forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising 
their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and 
expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of 
commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term. "). 
6. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1845. 
7. Id. at 1866, n.38. See Michael Slackman, Standard Pataki State 
Address a Familiar Call for Cuts in Spending, Taxes, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5 ,  1995, 
at A7. The present governor of New York, George Pataki, has proposed term 
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movement has produced one major constitutional amendment 
relating to national office -- the Twenty Second Amendment,$ 
which limits the office of President to hvo four-year terms.9 
Attempts by a substantial number of states to alter the 
qualifications for members of Congress, however, have 
encountered resistance by the courts. Indeed, at the time U.S. 
Tenn Limits was argued, no appellate court had endorsed any 
state effort, either by legislation or state constitutional 
amendment, to place l i t s  on the number of terms that U.S. 
Senators or Representatives may serve.10 Until recently, it 
appeared that courts and scholars were virtually unanimous in 
believing that the Constitution is unambiguous in establishing the 
fixed and exclusive qualifications for members of Congress 
relating to age, citizenship, and residency, and that only a 
constitutional amendment could alter those requirements.11 
In U.S. Term Limits, the Court reviewed an amendment to the 
Arkansas Constitution, adopted in 1992, that made a candidate 
for the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives ineligible to 
have his or her name placed on the ballot for national election if 
that person had previously been elected to three or more terms as 
a member of the House, or hvo or more terms as a member of 
the ~enate.12 Following a taxpayer's complaint seeking 
declaratory relief, the state circuit court held that this amendment 
violated the Qualifications Clauses in Article I, sections 2 and 3, 
limits for statewide officeholders such as the governor, comptroller, and 
attorney general, but not for legislators. Id. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend XXII. The Twenty Second Amendment stares in 
pertinent part: "No person shall be elected to the office of the President more 
than h v i ~ e  .. . ." Id. 
9.  Id. 
10. U.S. Term Lfi~zits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1852. 
11. See Mark R. Kellenbeck and Steve Sheppard, A~torlter S~tcll Viecoy? 
Term Linlits, Section 2 of tile Fourtee~uil Amendntent and rite Right 10 
Represenration, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1141 (1994). 
12. ARK. CONST. amend. 73, 5 2(a). Section 2(a) states in pertinent pm: 
"No member of the Arkansas House of Representatives may serve more than 
three such two year terms." Id.; ARK. CONST. amend. 73, 5 20). Section 20) 
states in pertinent part: "No member of the Arkinsxi Senate may serve more 
than three such two year tenns. " Id. 
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of the U.S. Constitution.13 The Arkansas Supreme Court 
affirmed, in a five to two decision, with a plurality declaring that 
states have no authority to change, add, or diminish the 
requirements for congressional service enumerated in the 
Qualifications Clauses.14 Such piecemeal restrictions by states, 
explained the plurality, would conflict with the interest of the 
drafters of the Constitution in qualification uniformity, since 
congressional representatives address national issues that affect 
the citizens of every state. 15 
The dissent argued from the premise that all political power 
emanates from the people, and that since the Qualifications 
Clauses contain no express or implicit restriction on a state's 
ability to impose additional qualifications on candidates for 
Congress, the people have the power to impose such restrictions 
through a state constitutional amendment. 16 Moreover, according 
to the dissent, the amendment did not alter any qualifications; it 
merely constituted a permissible ballot-access restriction. 17 
Writing for the majority. Justice Stevens began his discussion 
by referring to the Court's seminal decision in Powell v. 
McCorinack,l8 in which the Court reviewed the history and text 
13. See U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1846 (citing 
unreported decision of Arkansas Circuit Court for Pulaski County); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, 5 2, cl. 2. This clause states: "No Person shall be a 
Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, 
and have been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, 
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." Id. 
U.S. CONST. art. I. (i 3. cl. 3. This section provides: "No person shall be a 
Senator who shall not have ateined to the ase of thirty Years. and been nine 
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, bc an 
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." Id. 
14. U. S. Terl?~ Lirnirs, Irzc., 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994). 
15. Id. at 265 ("Additional age restrictions, residency requirements, or 
sundry experience criteria established by the states would cause variances in 
this uniformity and lead to an imbalance among the states with respect to who 
can sit on Congress."). 
16. Id. at 1875 (arguing that "where the Constitution is silent, it raises no 
bar to action by the States or the people") (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
17. Id. at 1885. 
18. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that the House of Representatives has no 
power to exclude a member-elect who meets the Constitution's membership 
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of the Qualifications Clauses. Porvell, Justice Stevens noted, 
traced the British experience with qualifications for membership 
in Parliament, and concluded that on the eve of the Constitutional 
Convention, qualifications for membership in Parliament were 
fixed, leading the Framers of the Constitution to conclude that 
the qualifications for membership in Congress should also be 
fixed and exclusive.l9 Compelliig evidence of the Framers" 
intent that qualifications are "fixed and unalterable" is found in 
the writings of James Madison and Alexander Harnilton.20 
Concurring with this view, Justice Joseph Story in his respected 
Commentaries on the Constitution21 drew upon the maxim 
apressio unius exclusio alterius22 to suggest that the affirmation 
of the qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence "would 
seem to imply a negative of all others."23 
Porvell also relied on the fundamental principle of our 
democratic system that "the people should choose whom they 
please to govern them."24 This principle, according to the 
majority, incorporates two other fundamental ideas: the 
egalitarian concept that the opportunity to be elected should be 
open to all persons of merit, and the postulate that sovereignty is 
vested in the people, conferring on the people the right to freely 
choose their representatives to the National Government.25 
requirements). Adam Clayton Powell (1908-1972) was a clergyman. politician. 
and Member of the United States House of Representatives from 1935-67 and 
1969-71 (D-N.Y.). ~VEBSTER'S NEW BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 814 (1983). 
19. 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1848-49 ("English precedent stood for the 
proposition that 'the law of the land had regulated the qualifications of 
members to serve in parliament' and those qualifications were 'nor occxioml 
but fixed.'"). 
20. Id. at 1849. 
21. 1 JOSEPH STORY, CO~~~~ENTARIES ON THE CON-ON OF THE 
UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1858). 
22. "A maxim of statutory expression meaning that the expression of one 
thiig is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S IAR' DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 
1990). 
23. 1 STORY, 5 625 at 433-34. 
24. Po~vell, 395 U.S. at 541. 
25. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1851. 
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Although Powell conclusively resolved the issue of whether 
Congress has the power to impose additional qualifications, it did 
not necessarily resolve the separate question of whether the 
Constitution prohibits states from imposing additional 
qualifications. Justice Stevens noted that every federal and state 
court hearing the issue had struck down a state's attempt to add 
qualifications for membership in Congress.26 Notwithstanding 
such unanimity, the majority was required to address, for the 
first time, the currently fashionable Tenth Amendment argument 
that each state has a reserved power to place additional 
restrictions on the choices its voters may make. The majority 
decisively rejected the Tenth Amendment challenge for two 
independent reasons. First, the power to add qualifications is not 
within the original powers of the states and thus is not reserved 
to the states by the Tenth ~mendment.27 Second, the Court 
argued that even if the states possessed some original power to 
add qualifications, the Framers intended the Constitution to be 
the exclusive source of qualifications for membership in 
Congress, and thus "divested" the states of any power to add 
qualifications .28 
The crucial distinction, according to the majority, is between 
the people as members of the nation and the people as members 
of a state: "[Tlhe Framers, in perhaps their most important 
contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly 
responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the 
people, and chosen directly, not by the states, but by the 
people."29 Thus, with the adoption of the Constitution, a new 
National Government was created that replaced the governmental 
structure under the Articles of Confederation,30 whereby the 
states retained complete independence as sovereign nations bound 
together only by treaties.31 
26. Id. at 1853. 
27. Id. at 1854. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1863 
30. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 178 1 
31. Id. art. 2. Article 2 states: 
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The new Constitutional plan created a direct link, not behveen 
the states and the national government, but behveen the people of 
the United States and the National Government. Under this 
arrangement, the states would be, in effect, a conduit, rather than 
the fountainhead: "In the National Government, representatives 
owe primary allegiance not to the people of a state, but to the 
people of the Nation."32 It is no original power of a state to 
appoint national representatives, and therefore despite the 
Constitution's silence, "[n]o state can say, that it has reserved, 
what it never possessed."33 The people's right to elect 
representatives to the National Legislature was a new right, 
arising from the Constitution itself. 
Moreover, even if the states possessed some original power 
over congressional qualifications, the text and structure of the 
Constitution, the relevant historical materials, and the basic 
principles of our democratic system, demonstrate that the 
qualifications clauses were intended to preclude the states fkom 
exercising any power over qualifications and to fur the 
qualifications in the Constitution as exclusive. Totally absent 
from the convention and ratification debates is any assertion that 
the states had the power to add qualifications.34 To be sure, the 
question of term limits, or "rotation," was a source of some 
controversy, but was ultimately rejected as "an absurd species of 
ostracism."35 The debates also underscored the Framers' interest 
in having uniform qualifications, thereby emphasizing merit over 
qualifications such as wealth, birth, religious faith, or civil 
profession.36 
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, an independence, and every 
Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation 
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled. 
Id. 
32. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1855. 
33. Id. at 1854. 
34. Id. at 1859. 
35. Id. at 1860. 
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (Madion); U.S. Tern1 Linlirs. Inc.. 115 S. 
Ct. 1842, 1847 (1995). 
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The Framers were clearly distrustful of the states, expressing a 
profound fear of possible interference by the states with federal 
elections. Although the Constitution gave the states the power to 
regulate the time, place, and manner of holding National 
electi0ns,3~ the Framers created a safeguard against state abuse 
by giving Congress the power to alter any state regulations 
relating to the holding of federal elections.38 As the majority 
opinion cogently explained: "In light of the Framers' evident 
concern that states would try to undermine the National 
Government, they could not have intended states to have the 
power to set qualifications."39 It is therefore "anomalous" and 
"inconceivable" that the Constitution would give Congress the 
power to assure that federal elections would be held, but then 
give states the power to set qualifications in such a way as to 
ensure that no candidate would be qualified for office. 
Further, the contemporaneous state practice with respect to 
qualifications and term limits reinforced the majority's position. 
At the time of our founding, states retained property 
qualifications for their own state elected officials, yet placed no 
such qualifications on their congressional representatives.40 
Moreover, despite widespread support and use of state term 
limits, no state sought to impose term limits on its own federal 
representatives .41 
Finally, the majority rejected the argument that the Arkansas 
amendment is not a true qualification, but rather, is a ballot 
access initiative. Constitutional rights, said the majority, are not 
so easily evaded; they would be of little value if they could be 
indirectly sub~erted.~Z Moreover, the clearly expressed intent of 
37. Id. at 1857. 
38. U. S. CONST. art. I, $4 ,  cl. 1. This clause states: "The Times, Places 
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature; but the Congress may at any time 
by law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing 
Senators." Id. 
39. Id. at 1858. 
40. Id. at 1865 n.33. 
41. Id. at 1866. 
42. Id. at 1867. 
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the Arkansas amendment is a self-acknowledged effort to 
disqualify long-term congressional incumbents from firther 
service, rather than to place reasonable restrictions on access to 
the ballot.43 Nor does the hypothetical possibility of a write-in 
campaign cure the constitutional defect. Such possibility is 
nothing more than a "faint glimmer. "44 Also, "allowing states to 
evade the Qualifications Clauses by 'dress[ig] eligibility to stand 
for Congress in ballot access clothing' trivializes the basic 
principles of our democracy that underlie those Clauses. "45 
In conclusion, observed the majority, allowing states to adopt 
term l i i t s  for congressional service would effect a fundamental 
change in the constitutional framework.46 Whether or not such a 
change may be a laudable initiative, it can come about only 
through the Amendment procedures contained in Article V.47 
The Framers' belief that qualifications be fixed reflects their 
understanding that although chosen by separate constituencies, 
43. ARK. CONST. amend. 73 pmbl. (Michie Supp. 1995). The Arkansas 
legislature found that long-term incumbents "become preoccupied with 
reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the people," leading to a 
system which is "less free, less competitive, and less representative than the 
system established by the Founding Fathers." Id. 
44. Id. at 1868. See U.S. Temz Lintits, Inc.. 115 S. Ct. 1868 11-43. The 
Supreme Court noted that since 1913 (year that the Seventeenth Amendment 
was ratified), only one out of over 1,300 Senate elections have been won by a 
write-in candidate. Id. In the House of Representatives, five write-in 
candidates have been successful out of 20,000 elections since 1900. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 1871. 
47. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V states in pertinent pm: 
The Congress, whenever nvo thirds of both Houses shdl deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution. or on the 
Application of the Legislatures of nvo thuds of the several States. shdl 
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, wvhich. in either Case. 
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution. 
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States. 
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other hlode 
of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; . . . . 
Id.; U.S. Tenn Lilnits, IIZC., 115 S. Ct. at 1871, n.50 (citing to previous 
constitutional amendments in the area of voting rights such as direct election of 
senators, extension of suffrage to women, prohibition against poll taxes. 
lowering the age requirement to vote to eighteen). 
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when people are elected to Congress they are "not merely 
delegates appointed by separate, sovereign states," but rather 
"servants of the people of the United Sta te~."~g 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy relied principally on 
the same fundamental democratic principles. He observed that the 
"whole people of the United States asserted their political identity 
and unity of purpose when they created the federal system."49 
The dissent's position suggesting otherwise, Kennedy said, 
"might be construed to disparage the republican character of the 
National Government."5O The Framers, according to Kennedy, 
"split the atom of sovereignty," establishing two orders of 
government and giving citizens two political capacities, one state 
and one federal.51 Although the National Government has limited 
powers, and must be held within those boundaries, when it 
intrudes upon matters reserved to the states, the converse is also 
true. It was the Framers' intent that there be no state interference 
with the most basic relation between the National Government 
and its citizens. the selection of legislative representatives.52 
Moreover, said Kennedy, if the Arkansas amendment were 
allowed, it would have the "incongruous" result of burdening the 
rights of resident voters in federal elections based on the manner 
in which they had earlier exercised it.53 "If the majority of voters 
had been successful in selecting a candidate, they would be 
penalized from exercising that same right in the future."54 States 
may not, according to Kennedy, burden the exercise of federal 
rights in this manner.55 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, has been 
characterized as carelessly worded, and breathtakingly 
48. Id. at 1871. 
49. Id. at 1872. 
50. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
51. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
52. Id. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
53. Id. at 1874 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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perverse.56 The dissent argued, in essence, that the  constitution*^ 
silence on the power of states to prescribe eligibility requirements 
for membership in Congress "raises no bar to action by the States 
or the people."57 Declaring that the Court's majority 
"misunderstands the notion of reserved powers,* Justice Thomas 
"start[ed] with some first principles."58 One of these "first 
principles" contained a remarkable passage that could have been 
written by Jefferson Davis or John Calhoun on the eve of the 
Civil War: "The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is 
the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent 
of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole."59 
The dissent fundamentally disagreed with the majority's 
conclusion that the Tenth Amendment could only reserve to states 
those powers that existed before the Constitution's ratification. 
State governments were doing the reserving, Thomas maintained, 
and it is "incoherent to assert that the people of the States could 
not reserve any powers that they had not previously 
controlled."60 The dissent conceded that delegations of power to 
the states, or prohibitions of the exercise of state power, need not 
be expressly stated in the Constitution but may arise by 
"necessary implication."61 The resolution of such questions 
depends on a fair construction of the Constitution. Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that when the federal government 
exercises powers expressly or implicitly granted to it, such as the 
power to establish a federal bank, the Court in the landmark case 
of McCulloch v. ~ a r y l m d 2  correctly held that the Supremacy 
clause63 bars any state from interfering with the exercise of such 
56. Jeffrey Rosen, Temnrumed: U.S. Supreme Corm Overnuns Stares' 
Congressional Tenn Lintits, NE\Y REPUBLIC, June 12, 1995, at 12. 
57. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
58. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
61. See id. at 1876. 
62. 17 U.S. (4 \'eat) 316 (1819). 
63. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states in pertinent 
part: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id. 
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power, as would be the case if a state taxed a national bank.64 
However, nothing in McCulloch conflicts with the proposition 
that, in the absence of any express or necessarily implied 
delegation of power to the federal government, the people of a 
single state are disabled from prescribing qualifications for their 
own representatives in ~ongress.65 
The dissent also took issue with the majority's suggestion that 
the Framers intended a "direct link" between Congress and the 
people, thereby bypassing the states. The crucial link, Thomas 
wrote, is between the representatives from each state and the 
people of that state.66 Thus, according to the dissent, "the people 
of Georgia have no say over whom the people of Massachusetts 
select to represent them in C0ngress."6~ 
The dissent construed the Qualifications Clauses as imposing 
minimum eligibility requirements. The democratic principles that 
contributed to the Framers decision to withhold from Congress 
the power to prescribe qualifications for its own members did not 
deprive the people of the states of their reserved authority to set 
eligibility requirements for their own members.68 The text of the 
Qualifications Clauses is not by its terms an exclusive 
formulation; it merely establishes minimum standards of 
competence.69 Plainly, the dissent argued, the people of other 
states could complain if the people of Arkansas decided to send a 
6-year-old to Congress, but the Constitution gives the people of 
other states no basis to complain if the people of Arkansas elect a 
freshman representative in preference to a long-term 
incumbent. 70 
The dissent also attempted to draw a distinction between the 
action of the people in amending their state constitutions, and the 
64. McCi(lloclz, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 361-62. 
65. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1995) (citing Tenth 
Amendment in support of the proposition that the States can determine 
qualification of their own elected representatives). 
66. Id. at 1882 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
69. Id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. at 1887. 
Heinonline - -  12 Touro L. Rev. 384 1995-1996 
TERM LIMITS 
action of a state legislature in prescribing qualifications: 
"Observing that the Framers specifically provided for Senators to 
be chosen by the state legislatures and for Representatives to be 
chosen by the people," the dissent understood this distinction as a 
reco,onition by the Framers of the "meaningful difference 
between direct action by the people of each state and action by 
their state legislatures."71 Thus, even if state legislatures are 
barred from prescribing qualifications for Congress, such 
regirements imposed by the people themselves are perfectly 
~ ~ 
constitutional.72 
The majority's reliance on contemporary state practice is also 
unhelpfui, according to the dissent. First, Article VI expressly 
prohibits states from imposing religious qualifications.73 This 
reference, the dissent contended, would seem to undermine the 
majority's position that the Article I qualifications were meant to 
be exclusive.74 Further, rotation out of office was increasingly 
disfavored on policy grounds because it was believed that states 
lacked the power to require it.75 Third, property qualifications, 
although widely required for state legislators, *may simply have 
seemed unnecessary" for federal legislators.76 It was much more 
likely that a pauper would be able to secure one of the hundreds 
of seats in a state legislature than that he would be able to secure 
one of the relatively few seats in the House of Representatives. 
The dissent also chided the majority for its radical holding 
which would allow congressional candidates who are mentally 
incompetent, currently in prison, or who have vote-fraud 
convictions.77 Finally, the dissent argued that the Arkansas 
71. Id. at 1893 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
72. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Norhig in the Consurution 
deprives the people of each State of the power to prescribe eligibility 
requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them in Congress. The 
Constitution is simply silent on this question."). 
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, 5 3. This section states: "[Wo religious Tcsr 
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office of public Tmt under the 
United States." Id. 
74. U.S. Tenn Limits, Inc., 115 S .  Ct. at 1906 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1908, n.37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
77. Id. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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amendment is not really a term limit, but simply a ballot access 
restriction; any person can seek election through the write-in 
process.78 The amendment is simply "leveling the playing field." 
Even though the Court rebuffed the challenge, the significance 
of this case should not be underestimated. If the Court had 
upheld state-imposed term limits, seventy two House members 
from seven states could not have run for reelection after 1996.79 
More ominously, according to Professor Laurence H. Tribe, the 
dissenting opinion, if accepted, would have posed a significant 
threat to national unity. He said: 
If the Constitution's failure to nail down a given matter with 
absolute finality becomes an excuse for the states to adopt 
measures that will be upheld by the Supreme Court regardless of 
how much they may undermine the integrity of the union, then 
the ability of the country to hold together in difficult times may 
be seriously endangered.80 
The majority noted, at the conclusion of its opinion, the 
distinction between the wisdom of term limit laws and their 
constitutionality. Twenty-three states had imposed term limit 
laws,gl and the "movement" continues to have strong populist 
appeal and powerful momentum. Whether this represents a grass- 
roots revolt against what is perceived as a despotic Washington, 
or simply a recognition that voters dislike and distrust careerism 
in politics, the decision in Term Limits is probably not the last 
word on the subject. 
The House of Representatives mirrored the action of the 
Supreme Court last March by failing to achieve the necessary 
two-thirds vote for a constitutional amendment.82 The 
Republican-controlled body thereby reneged on item number ten 
78. Id. at 1884-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
79. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Decision Opens Door for 72 To Seek Re- 
election to House, N.Y. TIMES, May 23. 1995, at Al. 
80. W. John Moore, Pleading the loth, NAT. LAW JOURNAL. July 29. 
1995, at 1940. 
81. See Charles Fried, Fonvard: Revohition?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 
(1995). 
82. 141 CONG. REC. H3941-03, R3. House Republicans fell 61 votes short 
of passing the resolut~on for congressional term limits (227-204). Id. 
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of its Contract With America. Nevertheless, the issue is very 
much alive. One Senator has suggested imposing term limits on 
the basis of residency, and barring anyone from seeking re- 
election who has been absent from his or her state for more than 
180 days a year for twelve consecutive years.83 It has a l s ~  been 
suggested that states could impose mandatory pledges on 
congressional candidates that would require them to say how long 
they intended to serve.84 Also, states might be able to indicate on 
the actual ballot whether a particular candidate favors or opposes 
term limits. There is, of course, the possibility that the states will 
organize a Constitutional Convention. 
The Supreme Court's renewed attraction to the Tenth 
Amendment has aided and abetted what has been referred to as 
the modem American Devolution. Employing the rhetoric of 
federalism, Congress has moved to eliminate programs involving 
unfunded mandates, to shift power back to the states in the form 
of block grants, to abolish the 55 mile per hour speed limit, and 
to eliminate or soften a variety of federal environmental 
regulations. Inspired by the Supreme Court's decision last Term 
in United States v. Lopez,85 a spate of la\vsuits have challenged, 
sometimes successfully, federal statutes such as the Brady Bi11,86 
the car-jacking law,87 the abortion-clinic-access laiv,86 and the 
motor voter registration act.89 
- ~ 
83. Kenneth J. Cooper and Helen Dewar, Ruling Isn't End of Figllt, Term 
Limits Backers Vow: S e m e  Defeat LikelyD but Some See Issrte for '96. 
WASHINGTON POST, May 23, 1995, at A6. 
84. See James Kuhnhem, Ruling Alters Tactics, Brtr Resolrle is Firm: 
Term-Limit Backers Consider Options Afer hfondqDs Decision. WSAS CITY 
STAR, May 23, 1995, at Al. 
85. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act is 
invalid as beyond Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause). 
86. 18 U.S.C. 8 922(s), (t) (Supp. 1995); Frank v. United States. N.Y. 
L.J., March 26, 1996, at 25 (2d Cir. March 15, 1996) ("[Tlhe commerce 
power of the United States is almost certainly broad enough to support such 
legislation.") (citing United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)). 
87. 18 U.S.C. $2119 (Supp. 1995). See United States v. Oliver, 66 F.3d 
547 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit distinguished Lopa, holding that 
carjacking is exactly the type of economic activity which Congress may 
regulate under the Commerce Clause. 
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Although the decision in Term Limits served to brake somewhat 
the Tenth Amendment's momentum, the Court has shown a 
willingness to consider, under a broadened and more flexible 
framework of state power, questions that seemed for generations 
to be settled. This suggests that the revived debate over what has 
been called the "oldest constitutional question" -- namely, the 
meaning of federalism -- is just beginning. 
88. 18 U.S.C. 8 248 (Supp. 1995). See Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 
67 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of provisions 
providing for a 15 foot buffer zone around the entrance of an abortion clinic 
where only two "counselors" may stand in the zone and speak to patients 
unless privacy is requested). 
89. 42 U.S.C. (3 1973gg (Supp. 1995). See Association of Community 
Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 75 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 1996). Illinois argued 
that it cannot be forced to administer a federal law promoting voter 
registration. Id. at 793. The law was held constitutional pending the state's 
approval. Id; Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 141 1, 1412 (9th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996) (denying certiorari to California 
Governor Pete Wilson's suit challenging the constitutionality of the Voter 
Registration Act). 
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